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Abstract 
 
This paper examines India’s development strategy, and to what extent it may be 
considered a success. It provides a brief history of why and how the strategy was 
adopted, as well as of its implementation, including the role of initial conditions, such 
as human capital, geographical location, and infrastructure. It analyzes the extent and 
reasons for success of the strategy, including policy, political economy, timing, and 
linkage of the strategy to economy-wide development. Particular attention is given to 
the relative roles of domestic and international actors, including the part played by 
foreign investment, trade, and other dimensions of openness. The paper considers the 
extent to which the strategy remain viable for the future, the challenges still faced, 
and what other strategies might be required. It concludes with possible lessons for 
other countries and their future development strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
India’s economy seems to invite animal metaphors, particularly those of the lumbering 
elephant or caged tiger. The former is consistent with a culturally or environmentally 
deterministic view of the country, or perhaps inspired by its size, which hinders 
nimbleness. The latter obviously suggests that there have been shackles placed on the 
economy, implicitly by policy makers. The experience of the last few years seems to have 
been favorable to the latter view, and invites a re-examination of India’s development 
strategy. What has that strategy been, and to what extent can it be considered a success?  
 
To answer that basic question, this paper proceeds as follows. It outlines the basic 
contours of India’s development strategy, and provides a brief history of why and how 
that particular approach was adopted. The description of its implementation includes a 
discussion of the role of initial conditions, such as human capital, geographical location, 
and infrastructure. Next, the paper analyzes the extent and reasons for success of the 
strategy, including policy, political economy, timing, and linkage of the strategy to 
economy-wide development. This is followed by specific attention to the relative roles of 
domestic and international actors, including the part played by foreign investment, trade, 
and other dimensions of openness. The paper then considers the extent to which the 
strategy remain viable for the future, the challenges still faced, and what other strategies 
might be required. It concludes with possible lessons for other countries and their future 
development strategies. 
 
 
2. Strategy Overview 
The concept of a development strategy implicitly assumes a role for government. 
Whereas economic development in places such as Britain, the Netherlands and the United 
States had been driven by relatively decentralized commercial interests (though often 
influencing, or aligning with government policies), later European models of 
development, such as Germany and France, relied more explicitly on direction from the 
State. Most strikingly, the Soviet Union followed a model that included not just State 
guidance, but intervention in almost all aspects of the daily functioning of the economy. 
The latter required an elaborate conceptual and administrative apparatus of economic 
planning. The Soviet model also diverged from previous State-led industrializations in 
attempting to remove, rather than co-opt or collaborate with the commercial classes. 
 
It is natural that the experience of capitalism in its imperialist form created a deep 
mistrust of the market institutions that underpin the capitalist system, in former colonies 
as well as other countries on the periphery of the system. This attitude affected views of 
international and domestic trade, international and domestic finance, and domestic 
 1
production in agriculture and in industry. Such attitudes are well documented among 
leaders and intellectuals in India, from before independence to the current day. In the 
1930s and 1940s, and even for several decades beyond, the Soviet model appeared to 
provide a viable and successful alternative for India. 
 
The centerpiece of India’s development strategy was modernization through 
industrialization. Private industrial effort was viewed as inadequate for the task. 
Underlying this view was a realization that infrastructure has public good aspects, or 
positive spillovers, that could lead to under provision if left entirely to the private sector.  
Even non-infrastructure sectors such as steel, chemicals or machine tools may be subject 
to coordination or linkage issues that require a “big push,” further supporting public 
intervention.1 Thus, India’s leaders embarked on a program of government occupation of 
the “commanding heights” of the economy. An alternative approach of using tax and 
subsidy instruments to influence private actors was possibly viewed as infeasible, given 
the limited scope of the tax base and quantity of revenue at the time.  Public sector 
enterprises were created to take leading roles in all industries and sectors viewed as 
central to the industrialization program, including steel, chemicals, and engineering, as 
well as trade and finance.  
 
Unlike the Soviet model, however, private property was not discarded, and democratic 
institutions were successfully created and implemented. This approach reflected British 
influence, particularly that of the Fabian socialists. In this context, bureaucratic control – 
by civil servants reporting to elected politicians – became an important feature of the 
development strategy. This manifested itself in multi-layered indicative planning 
exercises, administrative discretion in the allocation of financial capital, private sector 
industrial location decisions, pricing decisions, and numerous other discretionary 
restrictions on private economic activity. While active bureaucratic participation had 
been an important part of much of continental Europe’s economic development, as well 
as that of Japan, in the Indian case, its scope and depth were in many ways more 
reminiscent of the Soviet Union. In India, this approach of bureaucratic control can be 
traced to negative views of merchants and commercial activities more generally, which 
pre-dated colonial rule. 
 
A second key dimension of India’s development strategy was with respect to 
international trade and finance. In addition to negative perceptions of the results of 
international openness that were formed during the colonial period, there were two 
academic arguments for policies that restricted international trade and finance. The first 
was the older infant industry argument, which suggested that initial protection from 
external competition was essential to industrialization, so that firms and industries could 
develop sufficiently to compete internationally. This view also included restrictions on 
foreign investment and technology transfer, again because these would stunt the growth 
of domestic industries. The second argument was a more modern perspective of export 
pessimism, which held that exports of goods in which developing countries had natural 
                                                 
1 The “big push” idea can be traced back at least to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan. Modern formulations of this 
and related ideas, as well as detailed references, can be found in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), 
Matsuyama (1995), Basu (1997) and Ray (1998). 
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comparative advantages, such as primary products, were subject to inelastic demand, and 
therefore unlikely to be an engine of growth.2 In general, therefore, international 
openness was seen as threatening, without significant countervailing benefits. 
 
While industrialization was viewed as the linchpin of development strategy, 
policymakers certainly understood the importance of agriculture, since it provided (and 
still provides 60 years later) the largest source of employment in the economy. The 
potential for modernization of agriculture was not fully realized until the innovations that 
enabled the green revolution in the 1960s, but this was preceded by considerable 
government attention to creating the institutional and physical infrastructure necessary to 
improve agricultural productivity, including irrigation works and dams, rural roads and 
markets, credit cooperatives, price support programs and extension programs for 
education and training of farmers. Land reform was also understood as a way of 
improving productivity as well as distributional equity, but limited progress was made on 
that front due to political obstacles, namely, opposition from politically powerful landed 
interests. 
 
A final, significant dimension of development strategy pertained to improving the well-
being or capabilities of the population, by public provision of minimum levels of basic 
services in areas such as health and education. These had never been the particular 
concern of the State in India, though the British had begun to improve public health and 
sanitation along the lines of European progress in the 19th century. As a result of the 
latter, the population growth rate had increased by independence, but average life 
expectancy and educational attainment were both very low at that time. Tackling these 
aspects of impoverishment was also, therefore, conceived of as part of development. At 
the same time, higher education was promoted as critical to the main goal of 
modernization through industrialization. 
 
In sum, India’s approach to development strategy represented a pioneering attempt by a 
non-Western ex-colony to achieve higher standards of living through conscious and 
deliberate creation of institutions and policies, and through active State participation in, 
and direction of the process of development. It emphasized modernization through self-
reliance, while enhancing social and economic equity.  It is fair to say that this initial 
conceptualization of India’s development strategy was met with a reasonable degree of 
consensus and approval, both domestically and internationally. Academic ideas that 
found expression in India’s post-independence policymaking were relatively mainstream 
at the time. Many industrialized nations also took similar approaches to fostering 
economic progress in that era, albeit with different initial conditions. 
 
 
3. History and Implementation 
The previous section has summarized the state of thinking with respect to development 
strategy at the time of Indian independence, and in subsequent decades. To some extent, 
                                                 
2 This view was associated particularly with the work of Prebisch (1959) and Singer (1949), though one 
should note that this brief mention does not do justice to the many other dimensions and different nuances 
of their respective theses. 
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the question posed in the introduction, of the relative roles of environmental and policy 
factors in shaping India’s development strategy, remains. The task of shaping an answer 
can benefit from a brief historical excursion, and that is undertaken next, before turning 
to an assessment of implementation of the strategy. A key idea that runs through the 
historical summary is that India’s initial conditions at independence were shaped by 
institutions that had exhibited remarkable longevity, as a result of influential 
environmental factors.  
 
The Indian subcontinent is a distinct geographic region, bounded by oceans, mountains 
and deserts. It includes several large river basins, the most significant of these being the 
Indus and Ganges in the north, though several important rivers cross the southern 
peninsula. The monsoon rains are a central feature of Indian life, and contribute to parts 
of India being historically extremely fertile for rain-fed agriculture. At the same time, 
significant parts of the region are in rain shadows, and are characterized as semi-arid. 
 
Lal (1988), marshalling a large amount of historical work in the lens of economic theory, 
has argued that India’s terrain and environment have played a critical, even dominant 
role, in shaping India’s institutions. In particular, he argues that the region’s system of 
social stratification, which has survived numerous invasions and outside influences, is a 
consequence of the need to organize labor to meet the demands of agriculture in the 
Gangetic plain. In turn, this caste system has contributed to a long-running denigration of 
mercantile activities. 3 Indeed, the suspicion of merchants and traders is documented in 
writings by Indian intellectuals and leaders to the present day, and stands somewhat in 
contrast to the rise of merchant classes in parts of Europe even before the Industrial 
Revolution.4  
 
Furthermore, Lal argues that the subcontinent’s environment played a major role in 
shaping the system of governance. Most importantly, it led to a stable system of 
agricultural taxation which persisted through Muslim and British rule, and had strong 
elements of rent-seeking incorporated in it. The environment, along with political 
instability, also limited the scope of public works such as irrigation and flood control 
measures that might have improved agricultural productivity in the northern and eastern 
plains. 
                                                 
3 It must be acknowledged that Lal’s interpretation of Indian history and society is controversial. 
Nevertheless, one can accept many of the broad contours of his thesis, as summarized here, without 
accepting all the details, or an extreme version of cultural or environmental determinism. 
4 An interesting question is that of how India’s ideology and economic trajectory differed from that of 
Japan. Under the shogunate, Japan also harbored relatively poor opinions of mercantile and industrial 
activity. In the Meiji period beginning in the later 19th century, the country embarked on an explicit strategy 
of State-led modernization and economic development. This included explicit borrowing of institutional 
innovations from the west, and careful promotion of international trade and technology transfer. Without 
going into a detailed excursion that is beyond the scope of this paper, it can be argued that the Meiji State 
did at least three things differently than post-independence India: (i) it more effectively increased 
agricultural productivity and harnessed that surplus for industrial expansion, (ii) it gave freer rein to 
business interests, and (iii) it worked more vigorously to reduce and even abolish traditional social 
stratification. Despite some disagreements over historical measurements of standards of living and growth, 
it is reasonable to state that Japan, while initially continuing to lag behind the West, grew much more 
rapidly than India from the latter part of the 19th century until the 1990s. 
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A hierarchical political system based on layers of revenue extraction complemented a 
high degree of social stratification, and as a result, non-agricultural production in the pre-
colonial period was geared toward luxury items consumed by the ruling classes.  Thus, 
India had a deserved reputation for fine handicrafts, textiles and precious ornaments. 
Supporting this pattern, Mughal India also had a relatively high level of average taxation. 
Nevertheless, average standards of living before the Industrial Revolution were roughly 
comparable in India and Europe. 
 
Historically, India was an active trading nation, and trade relations led to a significant 
influence of Indian culture throughout Southeast and East Asia until the colonial period. 
Westward trade was also significant, and spurred by the early eastward push of Islam. 
Spices and fine textiles formed two important exports of the subcontinent. As is well 
known, European expansion and colonization was driven by competition among 
European powers for control of trade and trade routes.   
 
The colonial period was marked at various times by transfers of wealth from India to 
Europe, by restrictions on trade, and even direct limitations on domestic producers. In the 
case of other British colonies, efficient, export-oriented plantation agriculture became the 
centerpiece of those economies. India was too large and its environment not suited for 
such a transformation. Instead, the British used India as a source of labor for plantation 
agriculture elsewhere in the empire, and for its imperial army. To rule India efficiently, 
they relied on a co-option of the governance chains of Mughal India, and dealt with 
potential local unrest by limiting the level of revenue extraction. In turn, this limited 
investments in infrastructure beyond those required for maintaining external security and 
internal order. 
 
Lal (1988) argues that the British ultimately, in the 20th century, could not hold back the 
ascent of an indigenous industrial class, and the rising stirrings of nationalism led to 
increased protection of domestic manufactures in this latter part of colonial rule. At the 
same time, entry by domestic producers was constrained by the lack of domestic capital 
markets, and of access by these domestic entrepreneurs to European capital. A lack of 
competition and financial resources tended to limit technological progress in Indian 
industry. Without economies of scale, good access to industrialized countries’ markets, or 
complementary infrastructure and institutions, Indian industrial development by the time 
of independence was limited, but still better than levels in other colonies. 
 
In light of the historical overview, India’s development strategy at independence can be 
viewed as the reversal of one facet of colonial rule, but the continuation of another trend. 
With full-fledged democracy, in contrast to the colonial period (or even to preceding 
eras) government became avowedly an instrument of the governed, and public spending 
took on the objective of economic development as well as political stability. On the other 
hand, engagement with the international economy continued to be viewed with suspicion, 
and this colored policymaking quite heavily. In addition, the much longer tradition of 
disdain for merchants and commercial activity, which had not been altered under British 
rule, was also an important driver of policy conceptualization and implementation.  
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Perhaps it is the last of these characteristics that distinguishes the Indian experience from 
that of East Asia, and explains some of the peculiarities of implementation of India’s 
development strategy. In the previous section, broad contours of the strategy with respect 
to industry, agriculture, social welfare and international engagement were outlined. To 
some extent, the intended thrusts in all of these areas can be justified, and the overall 
approach has many defenders. Certainly, India’s growth rate went up from the pre-
independence period, health and education indicators improved steadily, modern 
industries were created, agricultural productivity increased, and greater self-reliance was 
achieved in many ways, while inequalities were held in check. 
 
On the other hand, poverty came down very slowly, the improvement in human 
development indicators was also limited, and democracy came under increasing strain, as 
competition for rents within the system became fiercer due to the limits on the 
redistributive options of government placed by slow growth. The limitations of the path 
being taken by India became apparent in the 1980s, in comparison to the sterling growth 
record of East Asia, and with the collapse of the Soviet model and its exposure as an 
economic failure. However, changes in policy and implementation have still been 
difficult to achieve, reflecting the constraints placed by existing institutions, interests and 
ideas. 
 
In each of the dimensions of India’s development strategy, three sets of problems arose 
with implementation. First, policy measures often were inferior ways of achieving 
avowed goals. Second, the system of discretionary bureaucratic control created classic 
‘vested interests’ that prevented reform. Third, the short-run political logic of governing 
India often conflicted with long-term economic rationality. In all of these cases, vigorous 
debate on economic ideas did take place, and helped over time to move policies, and 
implicitly India’s development strategy, in the right direction. The three types of 
difficulties with implementation are elucidated next. 
 
First, policies were often misguided, because economic principles were not always well 
understood. Quantitative controls, case-by-case discretion for approvals, and outright 
prohibitions permeated all aspects of the economy, including industry, agriculture and 
international trade and finance. Even when taxes and tariffs were used, so that the price 
system and markets could do some of the work of resource allocation, there were often 
multiple, arbitrarily high and non-transparent rates, which encouraged evasion and 
distorted decision-making. A major example of price distortion occurred with the 
exchange rate, which was kept artificially high, contributing to a fulfillment of the 
attitude of export pessimism. Competition policy was not applied in an economically 
rational manner, and in any case was undercut by the artificial restrictions placed on 
industrial capacity. In the realm of social welfare, a major example of policy 
suboptimality – one that has still not been corrected – has been in the design and 
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application of laws designed to protect the interests of labor in the organized industrial 
sector.5
 
Second, once policies were in place that created distortions, situations almost invariably 
arose where there were beneficiaries of these distortions, through the economic rents 
created.6 Customs officers and income tax officials became notorious for extracting 
payments in return for ignoring punitive restrictions or tax rates, but all government 
bureaucrats were put in positions where they had the potential to profit from the lawful or 
unlawful exercise of their discretionary control. In many cases, politicians became eager 
collaborators in, or even drivers of this process, to claim their share of the rents. Even in 
the current liberalized regime, some of these problems remain. Of course, policy 
restrictions and entry barriers also created rents for private economic actors – industrial 
license holders, middlemen in agricultural markets, licensed foreign exchange dealers, 
import license holders and so on. These groups also developed interests in preserving the 
status quo. Indeed, there was a long period after independence in which economic 
controls steadily increased, as more and more groups and organizations sought to create 
rent-seeking opportunities. 
 
Third, India’s size and diversity required considerable attention to creating winning 
political coalitions – in this respect, India is quite distinct from State-led industrializers 
such as France, Germany or Japan. A system in which the government occupied the 
commanding heights became a natural tool for seeking political advantage. Examples 
include the spread of all kinds of subsidies, especially to numerically important rural 
voters. These have reached ridiculous extremes, such as commitments of free electric 
power and water for farmers. Another example has been the nationalization of banks in 
1969, designed to create a populist image and electoral appeal for then-Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi as she sought to consolidate political power.7 Essentially, these exercises 
in competitive populism were often driven not by economic logic, however imperfectly 
applied, but by political imperatives. Once the new interest groups were created, as 
beneficiaries of the transfers or economic rents, they made it difficult to reverse the 
process, as discussed in the previous paragraph. 
 
It can be argued that the exigencies of India’s national and state politics in the 1960s and 
1970s deepened the control regime that had been designed to implement India’s 
development strategy. Beginning in the 1950s, and with increasing voice in the 
subsequent two decades, many academics had been arguing for some reorientation of the 
strategy.8 In some cases, these were minor policy adjustments. For example, the planning 
process was continually under review, as its efficiency was always suspect, in terms of 
public sector spending of ‘plan’ allocations for developmental purposes. In other cases, 
                                                 
5 In particular, the laws, or their interpretation, can make it impossible to fire workers, even if the firm has 
ceased to be operational, or is effectively bankrupt. Some court interpretations have even extended 
protections to workers’ heirs. 
6 India was one of the cases that led to the coining of the term ‘rent-seeking society’ (Krueger, 1974). See 
Singh (2004a) for a conceptual framework for considering India’s governance institutions. 
7 A counter-argument, that bank nationalization facilitated financial development, does have some 
empirical support, and is discussed later in the paper: see footnote 13. 
8 See, for example, Bhagwati and Desai (1970). 
 7
there were calls for an overhaul of the foreign trade regime.9 Certainly, around this time, 
East Asian economies such as South Korea and Taiwan (China) had successfully begun a 
major industrial transition, using export markets as a source of demand, and external 
competition as an incentive for efficiency and quality upgrading. This transition from 
import substitution to export promotion has been widely studied, and given empirical 
support, especially for East Asian cases. India did not make this policy shift, which could 
have been seen as mostly consistent with its initial development strategy, though giving 
international economic forces a greater role in driving industrial and agricultural growth. 
This critical dimension of development strategy is treated in more detail in section 5. 
 
 
4. Hows and Whys of Success 
How successful has India been in its development strategy? Using the colonial period as a 
benchmark, India certainly has done well. Its GDP growth and improvements in human 
development indicators were both well above the earlier era, and this accelerated progress 
began almost immediately after independence. This achievement came while preserving a 
democratic political system, with minimal reliance on outside help,10 and accompanied 
by the development of a rich set of governance and private sector institutions for 
delivering food, health, shelter and education to a much greater proportion of the 
population than ever before in the region’s history. Infrastructure investment was greater 
than before, industries were developed in support of modernization goals, and higher 
education, in particular, grew dramatically. India also sustained relatively low inflation 
rates, preventing the kind of tax on the poor that has been characteristic of Latin 
American economies, several of which have experienced hyper-inflations of varying 
severity. Table 1 summarizes some aspects of India’s economic growth performance after 
independence.11
 
On the other hand, as early as the 1960s, several East Asian countries began to outstrip 
India’s economic performance. Their example became the basis for a shift in mainstream 
academic views of development, especially toward emphasizing the benefits of openness 
to international trade. However, as noted earlier, in India this period was marked by 
political impulses that restrained economic policy changes in that direction. There was 
also the argument of Indian exceptionalism, based on its size, diversity and large 
hinterland, setting it apart from new industrializers such as South Korea or the city states 
of Hong Kong and Singapore. By the 1980s, India’s relative lack of success became more 
apparent, with the cumulative impacts of decades of higher growth in East and Southeast 
Asia. China’s embrace of the profit motive removed size as a major conceptual defense 
of India’s strategy for development, and by the early 1990s, China’s growth record 
clinched the argument. Even though India grew more rapidly in the 1980s than in 
previous post-independence decades, it lagged far behind China in its growth rate. Table 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975). 
10 The quantum of foreign aid was relatively low. However, India did receive critical help in the form of 
food supplies when domestic production faltered, and targeted assistance in specific areas such as setting 
up technology institutes and improving agricultural practices. 
11 The periodization in Table 1, excluding the latest two years, is due to Panagariya (2008), and is justified 
there.   
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2 compares India to China and to developing country averages in terms of per capita 
income and other development indicators. 
 
Growth in the 1980s was aided by some reforms, as well as a macroeconomic stimulus 
that turned out to be unsustainable (Panagariya, 2008), and an external payments crisis in 
1991 forced some dramatic changes in economic policy. Essentially, openness to 
international trade was increased dramatically through tariff reductions and replacement 
of import quotas by tariffs, and the scope of domestic industrial licensing was drastically 
reduced. Despite some differences among various empirical studies, the best evidence 
suggests that productivity growth accelerated in the 1980s and thereafter (Bosworth, 
Collins and Virmani, 2007; Bosworth and Collins, 2008), potentially representing a 
‘structural’ shift in the growth trajectory. In the 1990s and subsequently, India has been 
one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and it is this last period that can be 
unequivocally characterized as a success in terms of economic development. 
 
A dissection of India’s growth performance, however, offers some support for an 
exceptionalist view. The reason is that India has not grown through the conventional 
route of producing and exporting labor-intensive manufacturing goods, with quality and 
variety increasing over time. That pattern of development has theoretical (e.g., Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991) as well as empirical (e.g., Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2006; 
Rodrik, 2006) backing, and seems to fit the case of many East and Southeast Asian 
economic successes. India instead has followed a growth path that has been characterized 
by capital and skill intensities that are out of line with other countries at similar per capita 
income levels (Kochhar et al., 2006). 
 
Aggregate capital intensity in India’s economy had long been identified as relatively 
high, and was a consequence of policies that pushed heavy industrialization. India’s 
restrictive laws on hiring and firing labor have also contributed to a bias toward capital, 
though often (because of other policy restrictions) without allowing firms to grow enough 
to reap economies of scale. High capital intensity was also arguably caused by inefficient 
use of capital associated with the control regime, including domestic licensing and 
prohibitive trade restrictions. More recently, India’s incremental capital-output ratio 
(ICOR) has declined somewhat, suggesting better use of capital.12 Furthermore, 
investment rates in India have gone up in the past decade, especially in the last few years 
(Table 3). They are now approaching the levels observed in past East Asian successes, 
though still below China’s.13  
                                                 
12 According to calculations presented in Mohan (2007), Table 1, the ICOR was 6.0 in the period 1965-
1981, and has varied between 3.6 and 4.6 in various subperiods thereafter. Mohan argues that the period 
before 1965 was also a relatively successful growth episode, with low ICORs, though growth rates were 
lower because of lower savings and investment rates. See also Mohan’s Table 8 for ICOR calculations 
based on alternative periodization, and comparisons to other countries. 
13 In a more refined analysis, Sen (2007) identifies private equipment investment as the key driver of 
growth in India. He notes that this importance is consistent with theory (based on spillovers associated with 
this investment) and cross-country evidence. Sen also notes a high correlation between private equipment 
investment and productivity growth, which is consistent with a spillover interpretation. Furthermore, this 
component of investment was itself positively affected by public infrastructure investment, trade openness 
(by reducing the relative price of such investment) and financial deepening. This last cause is connected by 
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Despite improvements in capital use, India’s capacity to generate employment in labor-
intensive manufacturing still remains limited. As a result, there has been limited 
absorption of the rural labor force into manufacturing – this would have been the classic 
development model. Instead, Indian manufacturing has been, and remains unusually 
skilled-labor-intensive. The roots of this situation can be traced to the overall 
development strategy and its particular implementation through industrial and trade 
policy. An important aspect of the overall strategy that played into this mix was a bias 
toward higher education (as measured by private and social rates of return) compared 
with primary education. Labor laws which bite more stringently for unskilled versus 
skilled workers have also been a factor. Finally, it is arguably the case that social 
stratification, operative over two millennia and reinforced by colonization, has tilted 
policies in this direction. 
 
If manufacturing has not been as significant a contributor to India’s economic growth as 
is the case for more typical development paths, what has filled the gap? The services 
sector in India has received considerable attention as one of the engines of the country’s 
recent growth (e.g., Singh, 2006). The sector has contributed over half of GDP growth 
since the 1990s.14 The share of services in India’s GDP is an outlier with respect to 
typical shares for countries at similar per capita income levels. On the whole the services 
sector also displays some of the skill-intensity that characterizes Indian manufacturing. 
This is particularly true of areas in which India is best known as a global competitor, 
namely, information technology (IT) – specifically software development – and IT-
enabled services (ITES, e.g., business process outsourcing, customer service, medical 
transcription, and financial research). Note that even seemingly low-skilled areas such as 
call centers require levels of education and English language proficiency that are 
possessed by less than 10 percent of the population. 
 
Other areas of services that require education and skills beyond what would be required 
in typical factory jobs include financial services, and many components of tourism, where 
there is interaction with foreign visitors. On the other hand, trade and transportation are 
less skill-intensive, and one of the characteristics of service sector growth in India has 
been its breadth, across a very heterogeneous sector. In some countries, though not in 
Indian data, infrastructure services such as electric power and water supply are included 
in the service sector. In any case, the power sector is clearly one which has not grown as 
rapidly as targeted, even after policy reform and the growth acceleration, and it, along 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sen to bank nationalization in 1969, and provides an alternative viewpoint to that expressed in section 3 of 
the current paper. One way to reconcile the two perspectives is to accept that there was some positive 
impact of financial deepening via nationalization, but that subsequent deepening has come about through 
later reforms that have promoted competition in the financial sector.  
14 To some extent, India’s growth has been marked by a shift (as measured by share of GDP) from 
agriculture to services rather than to manufacturing. Kochhar et al. (2006), analyzing the period 1980-2000, 
find no correlation between growth and the share of manufacturing or of labor-intensive industries, but do 
find a small positive relationship between growth and the share of services. Using state level data for 1993-
94 to 2003-04, Singh (2006) creates a more general structural change index, and finds no correlation 
between the index and initial year per capita state domestic product levels but a negative correlation 
between growth and the structural change index. 
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with service sub-sectors such as transportation, has been a constraint on growth, (Singh, 
2006). Another infrastructure sector, telecommunications, has grown very rapidly, driven 
by rapid technological change, and pressure from India’s successful new IT industry 
(Singh, 2004). 
 
Software and ITES have been export-oriented from the start, and in some ways, their 
progress follows the classic development path. Initially, India’s software programmers 
were characterized by some observers as akin to sweatshop workers, though obviously 
with much higher education and skill levels. However, there has been a significant climb 
up the value-added ladder, so that India’s software firms now provide a wider range of, 
and more complex, services. Global competition has played a role in this evolution, as 
has the skill-bias of the Indian workforce. 
 
It has been argued that the success of India’s IT and ITES industries was the result of the 
post-independence development strategy focused on modernization and growth through 
industrialization. Certainly, the creation of top notch engineering and technology 
institutes as part of that strategy, and the availability of their graduates, contributed to the 
success of India in this dimension. However, software was never seen as an independent 
activity in IT – policy attention was all on hardware design and manufacturing. 
Furthermore, telecommunications development was stifled by a perspective that 
characterized the industry as providing a luxury service rather than a basic need. Software 
development was able to fly beneath the policy radar (it was not subject to the worst 
industrial policy controls), and then spur telecommunications reform through its initial 
success (Murthy, 2004). This was the key factor in its success, rather than a deliberate 
design of development strategy and application of policy (Singh, 2004). 
 
The success of the software development industry involved building direct relationships 
with business customers, and development of management expertise. Both these factors 
led to spillovers that generated the ITES industry in India, and thereafter contributed to 
successful new manufacturing efforts in areas such as automotive components, and to IT-
based development in financial services. New microeconomic evidence also establishes 
the positive productivity impacts of IT investments by Indian manufacturing firms 
(Gangopadhyay, Singh and Singh, 2008). The world-class rating of India’s software 
industry also has been perceived as boosting the overall level of confidence of young, 
educated people in India (Kapur, 2002), as well as increasing incentives for acquiring 
specific training and education. In sum, the importance of the IT industry in India has 
arguably greatly exceeded its direct contribution to growth. 
 
The acceleration of India’s growth in the late 1980s and thereafter has also had a positive 
feedback effect, through the creation of a substantial middle class (Singh, 2006a). The 
domestic appetite for consumer goods, both durables and non-durables, has spurred 
foreign and domestic investment to meet this growing demand. Rising incomes and 
demographic changes have also encouraged savings. A final factor in this mix has been 
improved efficiency in financial intermediation, through a combination of entry of new 
private firms, organizational reform of public sector financial firms, and substantial 
regulatory reform in the financial sector. In some ways, this combination of growth 
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factors is quite different from the initial development strategy, which was geared toward 
a much more limited set of consumer goods and financial services. Undoubtedly, a retreat 
from government control and intervention was necessary for the latest trends to be 
possible. Recent articulations by policymakers of the financial sector as an engine of 
growth are very different from the classic Indian suspicion of merchants, traders and 
other intermediaries that persisted in earlier post-independence India. 
 
To summarize, many of the broad goals of India’s initial development strategy were 
unobjectionable, but implementation was poorly done, and – perhaps inevitably with 
heavy government intervention – distorted by political imperatives and creation of vested 
interests. An overuse of controls on domestic and foreign trade and investment limited 
growth after early successes just after independence. The shift in strategy and policy with 
respect to these factors is considered further in the next section. India’s growth spurt has 
been aided by this deliberate shift, but also by “accidental” factors such as the rise of the 
software industry, and the concurrent innovations in IT and telecommunications that 
came from abroad. The skill intensity of recent growth in India raises concerns about 
inequality, and those are examined in section 6, along with other challenges. 
 
 
5. Domestic and International Factors  
India has historically been a significant trading nation, and it was the colonial experience, 
involving discriminatory British policies against Indian goods, that contributed to the 
formulation of a development strategy that emphasized self-reliance after independence. 
Prohibitive tariffs and extremely restrictive quotas constituted the trade dimension of the 
policy framework. Foreign direct and portfolio capital investment was also highly 
restricted, mostly through outright prohibitions. Even in areas where investment was 
allowed, it was on a case-by-case discretionary basis. Similarly technology transfer, 
which would require foreign exchange payments or associated investment, was also 
severely limited through a process of discretionary approval. In practice, bureaucratic 
controls made restrictions much tighter than they might appear to be on paper. Finally, 
capital flows abroad, or indeed, any flows of foreign currency out of the country were 
greatly restricted.  
 
A key underlying driver of all these policies was an overvalued exchange rate, which 
inhibited exports, and created an artificial scarcity of foreign exchange. As a result, a 
black market in foreign exchange flourished throughout India’s early decades. Even after 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned in 1971, India 
continued to maintain a somewhat overvalued rate. In addition to making exports 
expensive, this policy made imports cheap, and the ostensible goal was to restrict imports 
through tariffs and quotas to those inputs that would be required for import substituting 
industrialization. Only in the 1980s did a significant depreciation of the rupee begin, and 
this process of market alignment accelerated further in the 1990s, so that after a few more 
years, the exchange rate was market determined, albeit with heavy intervention by the 
Reserve Bank of India (the central bank) to control volatility, and sometimes the level as 
well.  
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The re-orientation of exchange rate policy, together with making the rupee convertible on 
the current account, contributed to an export boom, which has contributed to India’s 
growth from the 1980s onward.15 At the same time, of course, import restrictions were 
greatly reduced. Inflows of technology and capital inputs that permitted modernization of 
Indian industry increased in this period. In some cases, Indian firms have faced severe 
competitive challenges, especially from imports of cheap manufactures from countries 
such as China, and export competitiveness remains difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, 
increased openness to international trade, and a more rational trade policy regime, have 
been hallmarks of a shift in development strategy that occurred in the 1990s (Srinivasan 
and Tendulkar, 2003). 
 
India’s past restrictive policies toward international trade led to a dramatic reduction in 
its share of world trade after independence, and even now, despite recent gains, its trade 
share remains relatively small, even compared to the other Asian giant, China (Table 
4).16 On the export side, much of this situation is due to domestic policies that inhibit 
labor-intensive manufactures at efficient scales. In addition to labor laws, policies that 
have reserved various products and product lines for small-scale firms have inhibited 
entry and achievement of efficient scales. These “small-scale industry reservations” 
persist even now, though considerably reduced in scope, and they illustrate one of the 
major contradictions in India’s development strategy: it simultaneously sought to 
industrialize through investments in heavy industries, and to protect employment by 
throwing up walls around a range of traditional industries, techniques and firms. The 
result was a general stifling of competition, and failure to achieve efficiency, growth or 
equity goals in any significant manner through these policies. 
 
While exports still contribute a relatively small amount to Indian growth, domestic 
demand has been significant. As noted in the last section, domestic consumption and 
investment have been robust in recent years. Improvements in bank efficiency, the 
creation of consumer credit and mortgage markets, and modernized and transparent stock 
markets have all played a role in supporting domestic economic activity. While newer 
sectors such as ITES have been able to operate relatively efficiency, traditional industries 
such as textiles are still inhibited by the continuance of old controls and restrictions on 
entry and exit. Land markets and retailing also are two areas where restrictions and 
frictions are substantial. In these latter cases, a continued gradual easing of restrictions on 
foreign direct investment is helping to increase competition and make quality upgrading 
more likely. 
 
The interplay of domestic and external sector policies is illustrated by the textile industry. 
The industry is labor-intensive, and export-oriented. However, it contains a large number 
of small-scale producers, often with inefficient technologies. The depreciation of the 
                                                 
15 Panagariya (2005) summarizes India’s experience with external liberalization, starting in the late 1970s. 
He documents the acceleration in India’s growth rate in the 1980s, and ties this improvement to the external 
liberalization that took place. Several studies (e.g., Joshi and Little, 1994; Chand and Sen, 2002) formally 
establish a positive linkage between opening the economy and productivity improvements in 
manufacturing. 
16 In addition to Panagariya (2006), the source for Table 4, see also Srinivasan (2006). 
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rupee in the 1980s and 1990s, together with removal of international textile quotas, 
helped the industry. In 2007, however, an appreciation of the rupee due to capital inflows 
hurt exports and employment disproportionately in this sector. The first-best policy 
solution is to create conditions for microeconomic efficiency. In the absence of the ability 
to do that, however, an alternative policy is to keep the exchange rate low, through capital 
controls, sterilization of capital inflows, or both. This has also been a component of 
development strategy in East Asia’s success stories, and is likely to be used in India if it 
faces increased capital flows due to its recent growth record: currently these flows have 
pulled back in the face of a global economic slowdown and increased uncertainty. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that India’s external engagement has relied very little on 
external borrowing. Aid flows have never been substantial or persistent, and have almost 
disappeared as a significant contributor to the economy, though there is some project-
related borrowing from multilateral agencies. India’s external debt is very low, and its 
maturity structure does not indicate high risks of an external crisis. There has been some 
recent increase in external borrowing by Indian corporations, and portfolio flows and 
foreign direct investment have become more significant. In these respects, India’s 
development path differs from both Latin America and East Asia, and is reflective of 
continued conservative monetary management, and financial intermediation that is 
somewhat better than typical for countries with similar levels of income. 
 
 
6. Future Challenges  
While India has demonstrated that it can grow at almost double digit rates, comparable to 
those achieved by the economies of the East Asian “miracle,” it faces numerous 
challenges if that growth is to be sustained for long enough to raise average levels of 
living comparable to, say, South Korea today, or even China. Human development 
indicators such as literacy, educational attainment and infant mortality also show 
significant deficits, when comparisons are made to other countries with similar income 
levels (Table 2).  
 
A clear danger is that the current pattern of skill-intensive growth will be accentuated. 
Increasing inequality of income is paralleled by increasing regional inequality.17 These 
trends can create political instability, or lead to growth that peters out, leaving a wealthy 
class connected with the global market economy, and significant numbers of poor people 
– what one can term “Latin Americanization.” Reductions in public investments in 
health, education and infrastructure, and tendencies for the upper income groups to 
effectively secede into gated communities and private transport can accentuate this 
danger. Policy responses to this situation that re-introduce controls and exacerbate rent-
seeking (e.g., through expanded quotas in higher education, or the introduction of quotas 
for private sector employment) represent another threat to sustained high growth. One of 
the features of the Indian development model was its ability to balance different interests 
through formal democratic processes as well as informal political bargaining, albeit at the 
                                                 
17 Rao and Singh (2005) and Singh and Srinivasan (2005) examine much of the evidence for this 
phenomenon, and discuss causes and policy responses. 
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cost of higher growth. The challenge now is to create a new social contract that softens 
the growth-equity trade-off, so that both can be better achieved.  
 
As has been the case for a long time in India, social stratification does act as an inhibitor 
to equity. Many of the poorest parts of India, with the worst human development 
indicators, have high proportions of tribals or Dalits (former untouchables). Interestingly, 
the software industry provides an example of what is possible. Initially, the view of 
computer science as a cerebral activity with high social status made it attractive for upper 
castes in India, especially in the South, where quota systems had restricted access to 
government jobs for the highest castes. Over time, however, the industry has attracted 
entrants from all backgrounds. Global competition has promoted a meritocratic, relatively 
egalitarian culture in the industry. Women, too, are increasingly drawn into a specialty 
that does not suffer from the traditional social constraints associated with other 
disciplines such as civil and mechanical engineering. In general, growth and urbanization 
have begun to chip away at traditional manifestations of social stratification. It will be 
important for policies to be designed that improve access to education through targeted 
subsidies and supply increases, rather than increased use of quotas. 
 
Agriculture remains one of the biggest challenges for India’s future development, though 
it must be recognized that agricultural modernization cannot be a substitute for growth in 
labor-intensive manufacturing.18 After the diffusion of the Green Revolution, which 
introduced high-yielding varieties of several cereal crops, along with increased fertilizer 
use and irrigation, agricultural growth has slowed. Part of the problem is that farmers 
have been locked into growing low-value crops by the existing physical and 
organizational infrastructure and political arrangements. New investments are required 
throughout the agricultural value chain, but these also require innovations in risk 
management and adjustment assistance that have been slow to develop, especially for 
agricultural producers. Individual bureaucrats, visionary entrepreneurs and enterprising 
politicians together played a role in previous agricultural development, as did foreign 
expertise (Kohli and Singh, 2005). Clearly, a concerted approach to revamping this 
dimension of development strategy is required for India.19 Many of the changes required 
have to do with relaxation of controls, but others require institution building, which is 
more difficult. Improvements in agricultural growth, and rural development more 
broadly, will address some of the concerns with respect to inequality, and have a value 
from that perspective as well. 
 
While rural development through road building, better telecommunications connections 
and investments in health and education can help to create non-agricultural rural 
employment, it remains the case that urban, industrial employment must increase 
dramatically. As agricultural productivity increases, labor will be freed up and must be 
                                                 
18 A comprehensive analysis of agricultural policy in India, including its past defects and future potential, is 
in Srinivasan (2007). 
19 An important new aspect of this concerted approach will have to be environmental management. 
Whereas industrial development brings well-recognized traditional problems of pollution, the pattern of 
agricultural development in India, driven by subsidies for electric power and water and mispricing of inputs 
and of certain types of crops, has led to rapid environmental degradation in states such as Punjab. 
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absorbed into industry and services. Given the limitations of services as an employer of 
unskilled labor, Indian policy reform must be geared toward creating the conditions for 
large-scale labor-intensive manufacturing, for the domestic as well as the international 
market. This may be the single most important change needed in India, for sustained 
growth – it represents a very traditional, but logically sound goal for development 
strategy. The problem has been in agreeing on and implementing a set of policies that 
will support this goal. Microeconomic reforms of labor markets, small-business finance, 
industrial and vocational training, and land use policies are all likely to be needed (e.g., 
Kelkar, 1999; Srinivasan, 2007; Panagariya, 2008; and references therein). The urgency 
of creating job-friendly growth is highlighted by India’s demographic dividend, which 
will give it a bulge in the working-age population. 
 
In the last decade, India has made significant progress in improving the efficiency of its 
tax system, including direct and indirect taxes. Better administration of the income tax, 
reductions in penal rates that promoted evasion and corruption, and most recently, the 
introduction of a value added tax, have all helped to improve the revenue side of 
government, and reduce distortions created by the old system. There has been less 
progress on the expenditure side of government, and inefficiency of expenditure, as well 
as severe distortions caused by subsidies for rural water, power and fertilizer, all remain. 
The planning process is little changed, and there is still no good monitoring of outcomes, 
or assessment of efficacy of expenditures. In some ways, government expenditure and 
functioning is the last bastion of the old approach to development strategy, and will only 
change as the balance of political weight shifts to the modern economy comprising the 
entrepreneurs, professionals and the urban middle classes more generally. 
 
In the larger realm of governance, macroeconomic management on the monetary side has 
always been a relative bright spot in India. Inflation has been managed, and financial 
scandals and crises have mostly been avoided. There is certainly much to be done in 
terms of continuing the process of building new financial sector institutions, such as 
derivatives markets, modern risk managers, and venture capitalists. Perhaps the greatest 
macroeconomic challenge is the one discussed in the previous section – that of managing 
exchange rate policy, capital controls and domestic monetary policy for inflation control. 
Finding the optimal mix of instruments in this triad is especially difficult in a world 
where large quantities of mobile capital can overwhelm individual governments’ 
resources. 
 
 
7. Lessons  
India’s size can limit the lessons that might be drawn for other developing countries, 
which are almost all an order of magnitude smaller in total population. However, since 
economic reform has led to some decentralization of economic policy, the differential 
recent experiences of the Indian states provide additional benchmarking information. A 
fairly straightforward lesson from the overall Indian case is that both initial conditions 
and policy matter. Several states or subnational regions which were favorably positioned 
to engage with the global economy have grown faster since the economic reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s. At the same time, states that were not necessarily so well-placed, and 
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were lumped together as ‘sick,’ have diverged somewhat, arguably as a result of 
differences in economic policy.20
 
At the national level, the change in India’s growth rate and prospects, following policy 
reforms that opened up the economy to foreign trade and investment and substantially 
removed domestic industrial controls, seems to provide strong support for the view that 
policy matters (e.g., Panagariya, 2008), though this view is still not unanimous. To the 
extent that the various policy reforms constituted an overall shift in thinking, they 
together represent a change in development strategy, similar to what occurred in many 
countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall. A reading of speeches by prominent reformers 
such as the current prime minister and finance minister of India support the case for a 
conceptual shift from ‘governing the market’ (e.g., Wade, 1990) to ‘enabling the market.’ 
India’s experience provides support for this perspective on development strategy. It is 
also plausible that some of the areas where India faces significant challenges, such as 
agriculture and higher education, are precisely ones where reform has been almost non-
existent, leaving the old control regime with artificial scarcities and allocation distortions 
in place. 
 
However, it should also be clear that the lessons from India do not support any extreme 
version of market orientation. The standard economic arguments for public intervention 
in certain areas are also borne out by the Indian case. In fact, the Indian State spread itself 
too thin by trying to run all manner of industries, either by direct ownership or through 
elaborate discretionary controls, and it is plausible that this was a contributing factor to 
the slow progress in areas such as basic health, nutrition and education. The national 
government, as well as state-level governments, are still struggling with the reorientation 
that is required for them to become focused vehicles for the delivery of public goods and 
services. A similar struggle is occurring with respect to reforming the provision of law 
and order, property rights protection, taxation, and arm’s length regulation of industries 
where market forces alone may not guarantee efficient competition. 
 
A less clear-cut boundary for the government’s role lies in the realm of industrial policy. 
This paper has argued that there is little evidence for the success of industrial policy as a 
component of India’s development strategy after independence. Rodrik (2006) makes a 
modern general case for government intervention, based on the view that economic 
development is fundamentally driven by structural change in the economy, and that this 
change is “fraught with externalities and spillovers of all kinds.” However, the nature of 
government intervention as conceived by Rodrik is quite circumscribed. His conclusion is 
worth quoting in detail: 
What I understand by “industrial policy” is not an effort by the government to 
select particular sectors and subsidize them through a range of instruments 
(directed credit, subsidies, tax incentives, and so on). The critics of industrial 
policy are correct when they argue that governments do not have adequate 
                                                 
20 The illness metaphor was played on in the acronym BIMARU, which approximates the Hindi word for 
‘sick,’ and stands for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The second and third of these 
have shown improved performance, particularly in human development indicators, since the 1990s, and this 
can be plausibly traced to policy improvements. 
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knowledge to pick “winners.” [I]ndustrial policy is more appropriately 
conceived as a process whereby the state and the private sector jointly arrive at 
diagnoses about the sources of blockage in new economic activities and propose 
solutions to them. Industrial policy requires the government to take an ex-ante 
stand neither on the activities to be promoted nor on the instruments to be 
deployed. It simply requires it to build the public-private institutional 
arrangements whereby information on profitable activities and useful 
instruments of intervention can be elicited. 
It is not clear, however, to what extent Indian policymaking has achieved the creation of 
such ‘public-private institutional arrangements.’ It is unobjectionable to argue that doing 
so would be a useful step in meeting future development challenges. 
 
If India’s development failures and successes offer some lessons for other countries on 
balancing the role of government and market in development strategy, perhaps its most 
important lesson comes from its political institutions. Democracy in India, however, 
imperfect, has survived and deepened over the last six decades. It has provided an 
important institutional backdrop for the recent economic success of the country. If 
anything, it has begun to provide a vehicle for more vigorous competition among 
politicians to serve long-term constituent interests (Singh, 2007).21 Democracy has also 
allowed the media and civil society organizations to operate relatively freely in India, 
bringing greater transparency and accountability to markets and governments. The design 
of robust democratic institutions must be considered the greatest achievement of India’s 
strategy of development. 
 
If one recalls the chaos of India’s partition in 1947, it is clear that achieving sustainable 
democracy was not a foregone conclusion. To some extent, the heterogeneity of India, 
and the lack of any single axis of social domination made it easier to sustain the 
institutions created from 1947 onward: the contrast with Pakistan is perhaps telling in this 
regard. The same heterogeneity also created problems of multiple vetoes (Bardhan, 
1984). However, greater federalism and economic decentralization have helped break 
some of those previous logjams. The final lesson from the Indian experience is that 
carefully designed political institutions that can manage competing interests effectively 
are an achievable goal, as well as a supportive backdrop for development.   
 
                                                 
21 The dual importance of political and economic competition emphasized in our discussion of India is not 
dissimilar to the independently developed thesis of Weder and Weder (2008) for the Swiss case, as part of 
this project: “This paper argues that economic competition and political contestability are two key 
determinants of the successful development of the Swiss economy in the nineteenth and twentieth century.” 
This similarity in the analytical examination of the development of two such different countries (in size, 
history and environment) does suggest a value to the exercise undertaken in this “country role models” 
project. 
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Table 1: Aggregate and Sectoral Growth Rates 
 
Period GDP Agriculture, 
Forestry 
and Fishing 
Industry Manufacturing Services 
1951-65 4.1 2.9 6.7 6.6 4.7 
1965-81 3.2 2.1 4.0 3.9 4.3 
1981-88 4.8 2.1 6.3 7.1 6.3 
1988-2006 6.3 3.4 6.5 6.8 7.8 
2006-07 9.6 3.8 10.6 12.0 11.2 
2007-08 9.0 4.5 8.1 8.8 10.7 
 
Sources: Panagariya (2008), Table 1.2, and Reserve Bank of India (2008), Table 1 for last two years. The 
latter figures are estimates, and not finalized. 
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Table 2: Comparative Development Indicators 
 
 Low Income India China Middle Income 
Births attended by skilled health 
staff (% of total) n.a. 42.5* 96 n.a. 
GNI per capita, Atlas method 
(current US$) 438.53 530 1270 1938.11 
Immunization, measles (% of 
children ages 12-23 months) 61.52 56 84 86.43 
Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years) 58.62 63.42 71.05 69.73 
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 
live births) 83.88* 64** 33* 35.4 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 
1,000) 127.66* 94* 41* 45.18 
School enrollment, primary (% 
gross) 99.75 107.43 115.02 112.3 
 
 
Notes: *Year 2000, ** Year 2002, n.a. not available 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
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Table 3 
 
Year Gross Domestic Saving 
(percent of GDP) 
Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation (percent of GDP) 
1954-55 9.1 9.3 
1959-60 10.8 12.3 
1964-65 11.6 13.8 
1969-70 14.0 14.5 
1974-75 15.7 16.5 
1979-80 19.8 20.3 
1984-85 18.2 19.6 
1989-90 21.8 24.3 
1994-95 24.4 25.5 
1999-2000 24.8 25.9 
2004-05 31.8 32.2 
2005-06 34.3 35.5 
2006-07 34.8 35.9 
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Table 4: India and China in World Trade 
 
 India China 
 1982 1990 2003 1982 1990 2003 
Exports of goods and 
services as percentage 
of GDP 
6.2 7.2 13.8 11.7 16.2 29.6 
Imports of goods and 
services as percentage 
of GDP 
9.0 9.3 15.6 9.4 13.2 27.4 
Exports of goods and 
services as percentage 
of world trade 
0.5 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.3 5.2 
Exports of goods and 
services as percentage 
of world trade 
0.8 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.1 4.9 
 
Source: Panagariya (2006) 
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